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This paper investigates a new approach to understanding personal and functional
income distribution. I propose that hierarchical power — the command of subordi-
nates in a hierarchy — is what distinguishes the rich from the poor and capitalists
from workers. Specifically, I hypothesize that individual income increases with
hierarchical power, as does the share of individual income earned from capitalist
sources. I test this idea using evidence from US CEOs, as well as a numerical
model that extrapolates the CEO data. The results indicate that income tends to in-
crease with hierarchical power, as does the capitalist composition of income. This
suggests that hierarchical power may be a determinant of both personal and func-
tional income.
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Introduction 2
1 Introduction
Let me tell you about the very rich. They are different from you and me.
— F. Scott Fitzgerald [1]
Yes, they have more money.
— Ernest Hemingway [2]
What makes the rich different? Why do they earn more money than other peo-
ple? And why does this money tend to come from property, not wages? These
are the questions that underpin the study of personal (size-based) and functional
(class-based) income distribution.
Responses to these questions have fallen roughly into two camps. Neoclassical
economists argue that the rich are different because they are more productive. That
this productivity comes largely from property then signals that property is itself
productive. Marxists, in contrast, argue that the rich are different because they
exploit workers. By owning the ‘means of production’, the rich are able to extract
a surplus from workers. It is this exploitation, Marxists believe, that explains the
greater income of the rich. And it is the ownership of the means of production that
explains why the rich earn income largely from property.
After nearly a century of debate between these two schools of thought (with
little conciliation), I believe it is time to look for an alternative approach. What
makes the rich different, I propose, is not the productivity of their property or their
exploitation of workers. Instead, I propose that the rich are different because of their
greater control of subordinates — what I call ‘hierarchical power’. I hypothesize
that individuals with more hierarchical power tend to earn more income, and have
a larger share of this income come from capitalist sources (Section 2).
To test this hypothesis, I look for a correlation between income size and hierar-
chical power, on the one hand, and a correlation between income composition and
hierarchical power on the other. After discussing methods (Section 3), I analyze
the income of US CEOs. I find that the relative income of US CEOs increases with
their hierarchical power, as does the capitalist fraction of this income (Section 4). I
then use a model to test the generality of this CEO evidence. This model suggests
that in the United States, there is a three-way relation between income size, income
composition and hierarchical power (Sections 5 and 6).
In short, I find evidence that hierarchical power is connected to both income
size and income composition. At present, this is a correlation only. But it hints that
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hierarchical power may be an important determinant of both personal and functional
income distribution.
1.1 The Motivating Problem
This paper is motivated by a long-standing problem. Despite more than a century
of effort, we do not have a theory that adequately explains both income size (how
much one earns) and income class (the source of one’s income). We have three
types of income distribution theory (listed below). Each has problems.
1. Core Theories: Marxist and neoclassical political economy
2. Stochastic Models: Models that generate skewed distributions using
random shocks to individual income
3. Power Theories: Mostly qualitative descriptions of how power affects
income
The hallmark of our core theories — Marxist and neoclassical political economy
— is that they both assume value is produced. Neoclassical economists propose
that both laborers and capitalists produce value. In a competitive market, each
‘factor of production’ is supposed to earn its (marginal) contribution to output [3,4].
Here is how neoclassical founder John Bates Clark described his theory of marginal
productivity:
It is the purpose of this work to show that the distribution of the income
of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked
without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount of
wealth which that agent creates. [3]
Like Clark, many political economists of the 18th and 19th century (including
Adam Smith [5] and David Ricardo [6]) believed that labor produced value. But
they disagreed about the nature of capitalist income. This disagreement came to a
head in the writings of Karl Marx [7]. Capitalists, Marx proposed, were not pro-
ductive. Instead, they earned income by exploiting workers. Here is Marx vividly
describing this exploitation:
[C]apital has one single life impulse ... to make its constant factor, the
means of production, absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus-
labour. Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking
living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The time
during which the labourer works, is the time during which the capitalist
consumes the labour-power he has purchased of him. [7]
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The debate between Marxist and neoclassical schools of thought is now more
than a century old. Over this period, both approaches have been extensively criti-
cized. (For problems with marginal productivity theory, see Ref. [8–15]. For prob-
lems with Marxist theory, see Ref. [12,16].) My concern here is a specific problem
shared by both theories. Both approaches make it difficult to understand the size
distribution of personal income.
The difficulty owes to the productivist basis of both theories. Neoclassical the-
ory and Marxist theory both propose that labor produces value, and that this produc-
tivity is the source of labor income. Using this reasoning, both schools of thought
have come to similar conclusions: income differences between workers should stem
from differences in productivity.1
This thinking is the basis of human capital theory, which extends the neoclassi-
cal concept of capital to workers [17–19]. The idea is that workers can accumulate
‘human capital’ — a stock of skills and knowledge. This human capital makes
workers more productive and, hence, allows them to earn more income. Here is
how Gregory Mankiw summarizes this theory in his textbook on microeconomics:
“Put simply, highly productive workers are highly paid, and less productive workers
are less highly paid.” [20]
Although opposed to neoclassical theory, Marxists have come to similar conclu-
sions. If one assumes (as Marxists do) that labor produces all value, then it follows
that income differences between workers result from differences in productivity
(assuming similar levels of surplus-value extraction by capitalists). Writing about
the difference between skilled and unskilled labor, Marxist theorist Isaak Ilich Ru-
bin notes: “The difference of qualified from simple labor is manifested ... in the
increased value of the products which are produced by the qualified labor” [21].
Rubin’s logic is nearly identical to that of human capital theory. Skilled workers,
he claims, earn more than unskilled workers because they are more productive.
While shared by both neoclassical and Marxist theory, this proposed connection
between income and productivity leads to difficulties when we try to understand
the size distribution of income. The productivity-income connection implies that
workers’ productivity should be as unequally distributed as their income. Yet the
evidence suggests that this is not true. When workers’ productivity is measured
objectively (i.e. independently of income), it fails to explain differences in income
1There is a subtle distinction between neoclassical and Marxist theory. Neoclassical theory at-
tributes labor income directly to productivity. But Marxist theory attributes income to the value of
labor power. The latter is the labor time required to reproduce labor power. Since the labor power
of more productive workers tends to take more to reproduce, more productive workers tend to earn
higher wages.
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[22]. This leaves the ‘productivist’ aspect of neoclassical and Marxist theories at
odds with the evidence.
In hindsight, this empirical shortcoming is understandable. The facts of per-
sonal income distribution were discovered after the core theories of income distri-
bution were developed. It was late in the 19th century when Vilfredo Pareto [23]
showed that personal income was skewed and followed a power-law distribution.
By the time these facts became well known (in the 20th century), neoclassical and
Marxist theories of income distribution were firmly established.
While political economists were slow to react to Pareto’s discovery, mathemati-
cians soon looked for processes that could generate skewed distributions. They
found that a simple random process could do the trick. If individuals’ income grew
randomly over time, it tended to create a skewed distribution of income. This pro-
cess became known as a ‘stochastic model’ of income. (For early stochastic models,
see Ref. [24–26]. For more recent work, see Ref. [27–29].)
These stochastic models are important because they show how the dynamics of
individual income can lead to income inequality. The problem, though, is that these
models do not explain why individuals earn what they do. And since stochastic
models deal only with isolated individuals (rather than groups of individuals), they
are not helpful for understanding how income relates to social class.
That brings us to theories of income distribution based on power [12, 30–46].
These theories propose that income differences result from asymmetries in social
relations. The general idea is that people tend to use their power — their influence
over others — for personal gain. The result is that concentrated power leads to
income inequality.
I find the ‘power-income’ hypothesis compelling. It avoids the trap of attribut-
ing income to productivity. And it avoids the atomism of stochastic models. And
because it is concerned with social asymmetries, the power-income hypothesis nat-
urally lends itself to the study of social class. For these reasons, I believe that
the power-income hypothesis may provide a way to link the study of personal and
functional income distribution.
But while promising (in my view), power theories have been plagued by a sim-
ple problem. Because power has so many forms, it is difficult to measure. As a
result, power theories of income distribution have tended to be qualitative. This, I
believe is a major shortcoming.
The solution, I argue, is to reduce our scope and focus on power in a limited
context. To measure power, I propose we focus only on ‘hierarchical power’ — the
control of subordinates within a hierarchy.
A Theory of Income Distribution Based on Hierarchical Power 6
Figure 1: Measuring Hierarchical Power
This figure illustrates the calculation of hierarchical power. The red individual has 6 subor-
dinates (blue). Using Eq. 1, the hierarchical power of this person equals 7.
2 A Theory of Income Distribution Based on Hierarchical Power
In this paper, I focus on a single dimension of power — the control over subordi-
nates within a hierarchy. I call this ‘hierarchical power’. I measure it as follows:
hierarchical power = number of subordinates+1 (1)
This definition of hierarchical power is structural, in that it deals only with one’s
abstract position within a hierarchy. I ignore other qualities (like charisma) that
might affect power. I add one to the number of subordinates to signal that each
individual has control over themselves. To count subordinates, we add both direct
and indirect subordinates. Figure 1 shows an example calculation.
I propose that within hierarchies, individuals use their power to gain access to
resources. The result is that income within the hierarchy should be proportional to
hierarchical power. I call this the ‘power-income hypothesis’:
Power-Income Hypothesis: Within a hierarchy, individual income is proportional
to hierarchical power
I have previously tested the power-income hypothesis using case studies of firm
hierarchy. I have found that in case-study firms, relative income tends to grow
with hierarchical power [47]. Fig. 2 shows these results. I have also found that the
income effect of hierarchical rank cannot be explained by well-known determinants
of income like education, age, and firm experience [22].
2.1 Hierarchical Power and Income Class
This paper seeks to extend the power-income hypothesis to the study of class-based
income. To do this, I draw on the work of Nitzan and Bichler and their concept of
A Theory of Income Distribution Based on Hierarchical Power 7
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Figure 2: Average Income vs. Hierarchical Power Within Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from six firm case studies [48–53]. The vertical axis shows average
income within each hierarchical rank of each firm. Incomes are normalized so that income
in the bottom rank equals one. The horizontal axis shows average hierarchical power of
the individuals in each rank. Each point indicates a hierarchical rank in a given firm (in a
given year). Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% prediction interval. See
Ref. [47] for a detailed discussion of sources and methods.
‘capital as power’ [12].
Nitzan and Bichler observe that all societies have ideologies that legitimize
power. These ideologies do three things. First, they legitimizes the power of rulers.
Second, they justifies the rulers’ income. Third, ideologies create a distinct income
class for the rulers. The power of feudal kings, for instance, was legitimized by
religion (the divine right of kings). This ideology then justified the king’s income
and gave it a distinct class — taxes.
Nitzan and Bichler argue that much remains the same in capitalist societies,
except that the ideology is no longer religion. It is ownership. The ideology of
ownership justifies the power and income of capitalist rulers, and it gives these
rulers a separate income class. Owners earn profit. Non-owners earn wages.
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Figure 3: A Sole-Ownership Model of Capitalist Income in a Hierarchy
This figure shows how class-based income might relate to hierarchical rank. We suppose
that a capitalist is the sole owner of a firm. This gives the capitalist the legal right to
command the firm hierarchy. From this position of power, the capitalist divides the firm
income stream and pays himself/herself capitalist income (profit). Everyone else earns
labor income. Expanding on Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of ‘capital as power’, I treat
‘capital’ as the commodification of the owner’s hierarchical power [12].
I take this thinking and apply it to hierarchies. I argue that ownership is an ideol-
ogy for justifying hierarchical power. To understand how this might work, imagine
you buy all the shares of a corporation. As the sole owner, you now command the
corporate hierarchy. In effect, you purchased hierarchical power. Once in com-
mand of the hierarchy, you have the power to distribute resources within it. You
can divide the firm’s income stream, keeping some for yourself and giving the rest
to your subordinates. Like the feudal king, your income then gets its own class. As
owner, you earn profit (capitalist income). Those you command earn wages (labor
income).
This reasoning leads to a simple model of how capitalist income might relate to
hierarchical power. Shown in Figure 3, a single owner commands the hierarchy, and
uses his/her authority to divide the firm’s income stream. The owner earns capitalist
income. Everyone else earns labor income. Expanding on Nitzan and Bichler’s
concept of ‘capital as power’, I represent capital as the commodified ownership of
the hierarchy.
2.2 A Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis
Our model in Figure 3 is intuitive, but likely too simple. The problem is that there
is only a single owner. In modern firms, partial ownership is the norm. This means
that ownership is divided among many people.
Does partial ownership mean that capitalists no longer control the corporate
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Figure 4: A Gradient Model of Capitalist Income in a Hierarchy
This figure shows a gradient model of class-based income. Ownership is distributed among
many individuals but remains connected to hierarchical power. Top-ranked individuals
have large ownership shares, while bottom-ranked individuals have small ownership shares.
Thus capitalist income fraction increases as a function of hierarchical power. I call this the
‘capitalist gradient hypothesis’.
hierarchy? Berle and Means thought so [30]. They argued that diffuse ownership
caused capitalists to cede control to professional managers. The problem with Berle
and Means’ ‘separation thesis’, however, is that it assumes a dichotomy between
owners and non-owners. But the truth is that over the 20th century, accounting
practices have become more complex. Many owners now pay themselves a salary
— a non-ownership income. And many employees earn income from stock options
— a form of ownership income.
Instead of a dichotomy, what if there is a gradient of ownership within firm
hierarchies? This would look like Figure 4. Here the firm has many owners. But
ownership is still related to hierarchical power. Those at the top have a large owner-
ship stake while those at the bottom have a small one. With this spread of ownership
comes a spread of capitalist income. Those at the top still earn mostly capitalist in-
come, and those at the bottom still earn mostly labor income. But in between, the
lines are blurred. In short, income composition is (at least in part) a function of
hierarchical power. I call this the ‘capitalist gradient hypothesis’:
Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis: The capitalist fraction of individual income in-
creases with hierarchical power
We can interpret this hypothesis a few different ways. First, we could apply it to
a single firm. But this is realistic only for firms that are fully employee owned. Such
firms do exist, but are not the norm. Second, we could apply the capitalist gradient
hypothesis to employee stock ownership plans. These give partial ownership to a
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firm’s employees. The problem is that employee ownership makes up about 4% of
total US market capitalization.2 Thus it is not the main source of capitalist income.
I interpret the capitalist gradient hypothesis at the societal level. I admit that the
ownership structure of any given firm is complex. I also admit that individuals earn
capitalist income from a variety of firms. But at the societal level, I hypothesize that
individuals with more hierarchical power (within a given firm) earn a larger fraction
of their income from capitalist sources.
3 Methods: Classifying Income
To test the capitalist gradient hypothesis, we must put income into classes. How we
do this depends on our ideas about property and ownership. I discuss here two ways
of classifying income — one that makes sense from a neoclassical standpoint, and
one that makes sense if we treat ownership as a tool for power.
In both approaches, labor income is defined the same way. It is income that
does not come from ownership. The sticking point is capitalist income. Does cap-
italist income come from any form of ownership. Or just some forms? The answer
depends on our preconceptions about property. If, like neoclassical economists,
we think property is a thing that produces value, then all ownership is the same.
We should use the income class system in Table 1 and treat all property income as
capitalist.
The problem with this system is that it mixes two forms of ownership — scal-
able and non-scalable. Corporate ownership is scalable. Corporations range from
tiny shell companies to giant firms like Walmart. They can be any size. But by a
quirk of the law, this is not true for proprietor and rental ownership. These forms
of ownership are non-scalable. By definition, rent can flow only to unincorporated
individuals. And proprietors are mostly the self-employed. If either a landlord or a
proprietor grows their business, they will incorporate and their income will be re-
classified as profit. By legal quirk, then, landlord and proprietor forms of ownership
are inherently small scale.
Why does the distinction between scalable and non-scalable ownership matter?
In neoclassical theory it doesn’t, because all property is treated as productive. But
in my theory of income distribution based on hierarchical power, the distinction
matters. I propose that capitalists are not simply those who own property. Instead,
capitalists are those who own hierarchy. This means we want to distinguish be-
2In 2017, employee ownership plans had total assets of roughly $1.3 trillion [54], while total US
market capitalization was roughly $30 trillion, according to the Russel 3000 index.
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Table 1: Income Classes if all Owners are Capitalists
Income Type Symbol Definition Composition
Labor Income L
monetary returns to
non-owners
wages/salaries + pensions
Capitalist Income K1
monetary returns to
owners
distributed corporate profit + interest + rents
+ proprietor income + capital gains on all
property
Table 2: Income Classes if Only Corporate Owners are Capitalists
Income Type Symbol Definition Composition
Labor Income L
monetary returns to
non-owners
wages/salaries + pensions
Small-Scale Owner
Income
monetary returns to
non-corporate ownership
rents + proprietor income + capital gains on
rental or proprietor property
Capitalist Income K2
monetary returns to
corporate ownership
distributed corporate profit + interest+ capital
gains on corporate equity and bonds
‘Distributed corporate profits’ are paid to individuals. This includes dividends from M corporations
and profit from S corporations.
tween corporate and non-corporate ownership. Because corporate owners can own
large firms, they can control large hierarchies. I therefore define corporate owners
as capitalists. In contrast, non-corporate owners cannot control hierarchies because
they own small firms. Thus I put non-corporate owners into separate category of
small-scale ownership.
The three-class system shown in Table 2 is my preferred class system for testing
the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Unfortunately the available empirical data does
not (for the most part) fit cleanly into these categories.
3.1 Empirical Measures of Class-Based Income
Because of data constraints, I use the measures of capitalist income shown in Ta-
ble 3.
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Table 3: Methods for Measuring Class-Based Income in the United States
Measure Symbol Source Composition Use
Labor Income L*
World Inequality
Database (WID)
wages/salaries + pensions +
‘labor’ portion of proprietor
income
Fig. 11
Capitalist Income of
CEOs
KCEO Execucomp
realized gains from stock
options
Fig. 7, basis for
hierarchy model
Capitalist Income
(All Ownership)
K1*
World Inequality
Database (WID)
distributed corporate profit +
interest + rents + ‘capital’
portion of proprietor income +
capital gains on all property
Figs. 12 and 14
Capitalist Income
(Corporate Ownership
Only)
K2
World Inequality
Database (WID)
distributed corporate profit +
interest + capital gains on
corporate equity
Fig. 14
Notes: Pension income includes employee and employer contributions. It excludes asset income
from pension investments. ‘Distributed corporate profits’ are paid to individuals. This includes
dividends from M corporations and profit from S corporations. I focus on distributed corporate
profits because I am interested in personal income. The other forms of profit (taxed profit and
retained earnings) do not flow directly to individuals. For sources and methods, see Section 8.
When studying CEO income (Section 4), I measure capitalist income using the
realized gains from stock options. This is not ideal because it excludes income
from CEOs’ personal investments. Still, stock options are a significant source of
capitalist income. The realized gain is the difference between the option value and
the market value at the exercise time. This gain is taxable income [55].
To measure the distribution of US income by class (Section 5), I use data from
the World Inequality Database (WID). The WID data has unparalleled depth, but
comes with some caveats. WID income classes (Table 3) do not align with any
of my own (Tables 1 and 2). The WID data divides proprietor income into capital
and labor components. This means some proprietor income is classified as labor
income and some is classified as capitalist income. The rationale is that part of
a proprietor’s income comes from their property, and part comes from their labor.
This method comes from Piketty et al. [56], who are the primary source of the WID
data. Piketty et al. assign to proprietors the same capital-labor mix as the corporate
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sector.
The WID labor income series L* (Table 3) is like my definition L (Table 1), but
with some proprietor income mixed in. Similarly, the WID capitalist income series
K1* is like my definition K1, but with some proprietor income mixed in. When
possible, I construct my own measure of capitalist income, K2 (Table 3). But due
to WID data constraints, I can do this only for certain types of analysis.
As shown in Table 3, I use and compare different measures of capitalist income
throughout the paper. This is by necessity. The available data relating hierarchical
power to income size and income class is scarce. To test my hypotheses, I use
measures of class-based income that are non-ideal , and I compare data sets that
are not perfectly compatible. Given the coarseness of these methods, we should
consider the results preliminary.
4 A Case Study of US CEOs
To study how income size and income class relate to hierarchical power, I use data
from US CEOs. I turn to CEOs because their role as corporate leaders provides a
simple way to measure their hierarchical power. The hierarchical power of a CEO is
equivalent to the size of the firm they command. For instance, if a CEO commands a
firm with 100 employees, then 99 of them are subordinate to the CEO. So the CEO’s
hierarchical power is 99+1 = 100. Figure 5 shows this equivalence between firm
size and the hierarchical power of the CEO. I use this method to investigate how
CEO income and the capitalist fraction of this income relate to hierarchical power.
The CEO data comes from Compustat and Execucomp and covers the years
2006–2016. For sources and methods, see Section 8.
4.1 CEO Pay vs. Hierarchical Power
To test how CEO income relates to hierarchical power, I regress the following equa-
tion onto CEO data
ln(C f ,t) = β ln(Pf ,t) + d (2)
Here C is the CEO pay ratio — the ratio between CEO income and average pay
within the firm. P is the hierarchical power of the CEO, measured using firm size.
The parameter β , which I call the ‘power-income exponent’, measures how rapidly
CEO income grows with hierarchical power. The parameter d (which I do not
report) indicates the value for ln(C) when ln(P) = 0. (We can think of d as the pay
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Figure 5: Using Firm Size to Measure the Hierarchical Power of CEOs
This figure illustrates how we can use firm size to measure the hierarchical power of CEOs.
Each hierarchy represents a different firm, with the CEO at the top (red). If firm size
is x, each CEO has x− 1 subordinates. Since hierarchical power equals the number of
subordinates plus one, CEO hierarchical power is equal to firm size x.
premium earned by CEOs that is independent of firm size.) The subscripts f and t
indicate the firm and year, respectively.
I use Eq. 2 for three different regressions. I first regress CEO pay onto hier-
archical power for all firm-year observations (all values of f and t). I report the
resulting power-income exponent as β . Results are shown in Figure 6A. Each data
point indicates a CEO observation in a given year.
Next, I regress Eq. 2 onto CEO data in each year t. The resulting power-income
exponent βt indicates how rapidly CEO income increases with hierarchical power
across firms in a given year. Results are shown in Figure 6B. Between 2006 and
2016, βt trended slightly upwards.
Lastly, I regress Eq. 2 onto CEO data within each firm f . This regression
indicates the firm-specific trend between CEO pay and hierarchical power — a
relation observed within each firm over the years 2006–2016. I report the resulting
power-income exponent as β f . Results are shown in Figure 6C. The histogram
indicates the distribution of β f across all firms. The vertical lines show the mean of
β f with the 95% confidence interval.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for the analysis. The trend between firms (βt)
is statistically consistent with the trend within firms (βt). Note, however that the
trend within firms is, on average, not statistically significant. This is likely due to
the short time period of the analysis.
To summarize, I find that among the US CEOs studied here, relative income
increases consistently with hierarchical power. This appears to be true both between
and within firms.
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Figure 6: Relative Income vs. Hierarchical Power Among US CEOs
This figure analyzes how the relative income of US CEOs (as measured by the CEO pay
ratio) relates to hierarchical power. The data includes roughly 3000 CEO observations over
the years 2006–2016. Panel A shows data over all years. Panel B shows how the trend
between firms has changed over time. βt is the power-income exponent (between firms) in
a given year. Panel C shows the trend within firms. β f is the power-income exponent within
specific firms. The histogram shows the distribution of β f for all firms. Vertical lines show
the mean of β f with the associated confidence interval. For data sources and methods, see
Section 8.
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Table 4: Power-Income Exponents for US CEOs
Statistic Value 95% CI R2 p
All Compustat Firm-Year
Observations
β 0.45 0.43 < β < 0.47 0.44 0
Annual Trend Between
Compustat Firms
β¯t 0.45 0.43 < β¯t < 0.47 0.45 (R¯2) 1.1×10−23 ( p¯)
Trend Over Time Within
Compustat Firms
β¯ f 0.65 0.25 < β¯ f < 1.04 0.23 (R¯2) 0.34 (p¯)
Statistics are for the regression equation shown in Eq. 2. β is the power-income exponent across
all data. βt is the power-income exponent between firms in a given year. β f is the power-income
exponent within a firm (across time).
Table 5: CEO Capitalist Income Fraction vs. Hierarchical Power
Statistic Value 95% CI R2 p
All Compustat Firm-Year
Observations
κ 0.028 0.0258 < κ < 0.0301 0.03 1.4×10−130
Annual Trend Between
Compustat Firms
κ¯t 0.027 0.0216 < κ¯t < 0.0313 0.03 (R¯2) 2×10−4 (p¯)
Trend Over Time Within
Compustat Firms
κ¯ f 0.102 0.0366 < κ¯ f < 0.1678 0.19 (R¯2) 0.366 (p¯)
Binned Analysis of All
Compustat Firm-Year
Observations
κ¯bin 0.043 0.0426 < κ¯bin < 0.043 0.92 (R¯2) 1.9×10−5 ( p¯)
Statistics are for the regression equation shown in Eq. 4. κ is the capitalist-gradient slope across all
data. κt is the capitalist-gradient slope between firms in a given year. κt is the capitalist-gradient
slope within a firm (across time). κbin is the capitalist gradient slope for a binned analysis (by firm
size) of CEO data.
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Figure 7: Capitalist Fraction of Income vs. Hierarchical Power Among US
CEOs
This figure analyzes how the capitalist fraction of CEO income relates to hierarchical power.
The data includes roughly 20,000 CEO observations over the years 2006–2016. Panel A
shows data over all years. Panel B shows how the trend between firms has changed over
time. κt is the capitalist-gradient slope (between firms) in a given year. Panel C shows the
trend within firms. κ f is the capitalist-gradient slope within specific firms. The histogram
shows the distribution of κ f for all firms. Vertical lines show the mean of κ f with the
associated confidence interval. For data sources and methods, see Section 8.
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Figure 8: A Binned Analysis of the Capitalist Fraction of CEO Income
This figure shows a binned analysis of the relation between the capitalist fraction of CEO
income and the hierarchical power of CEOs. I group the CEO data into firm-size bins that
are log spaced. Within each bin, I plot the median of the capitalist fraction of income against
the midpoint of the firm-size bin. The red line indicates the regressed trend on this binned
data. To incorporate uncertainty caused by the choice of bin size, I regress Eq. 5 onto CEO
data for a variety of different bin sizes. The red shaded region indicates the 95% confidence
interval of the regression.
4.2 Capitalist Fraction of CEO Pay vs. Hierarchical Power
I define the capitalist fraction of CEO income as the portion of total compensation
coming from stock options:
Capitalist Fraction of CEO Income =
Realized Gains from Stock Options
Total Compensation
(3)
I measure the capitalist fraction of CEO income using gains from stock options
because this data is readily available. (Other forms of capitalist income earned by
CEOs, such as dividends on personal investments, are not reported publicly.)
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To test how the capitalist fraction of CEO income relates to hierarchical power,
I regress the following equation onto CEO data:
K f ,t = κ ln(Pf ,t) + d (4)
Here K is the capitalist fraction of the CEO’s income. P is the hierarchical power
of the CEO, measured using firm size. The parameter κ , which I call the ‘capitalist-
gradient slope’, measures how rapidly the capitalist fraction of CEO income grows
with hierarchical power. The parameter d (which I do not report) indicates the value
for K when ln(P) = 0. (We can think of d as the capitalist fraction of CEO income
that is independent of firm size.) The subscripts f and t indicate the firm and year,
respectively.
I use Eq. 4 for three different regressions. I first regress the capitalist fraction of
CEO pay onto hierarchical power for all firm-year observations (all values of f and
t). I report the resulting capitalist-gradient slope as κ . Results are shown in Figure
7A. Each data point indicates a CEO observation in a given year.
Next, I regress Eq. 4 onto CEO data in each year t. The resulting capitalist-
gradient slope κt indicates how rapidly the capitalist fraction of CEO income in-
creases with hierarchical power across firms in each year. Results are shown in
Figure 7B. Between 2006 and 2016, βt trended slightly upwards.
Lastly, I regress Eq. 4 onto CEO data within each firm f . This regression
indicates the firm-specific relation between the capitalist fraction of CEO pay and
hierarchical power — a relation observed within each firm over the years 2006–
2016. I report the resulting capitalist-gradient slope as κ f . Results are shown in
Figure 7C. The histogram indicates the distribution of κ f across all firms. The
vertical lines show the mean of κ f with the 95% confidence interval.
Table 5 shows summary statistics for the analysis. The trend between firms (κt)
is smaller than the trend within firms (κ f ). Note, however that the trend within firms
is, on average, not statistically significant. The greater value of κ f is likely due, in
part, to a secular increase in the capitalist fraction of CEO income over the time
studied here.
As visualized in Figure 7A, the trend between the capitalist fraction of CEO
income and hierarchical power is noisy. To get a better sense for this trend, I conduct
a binned analysis of the CEO data. I group CEO data into firm-size bins that are log
spaced. Within each bin, I calculate the median of the capitalist fraction of income,
as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles. Results are shown in Figure 8.
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Onto this binned data, I regress the following equation:
K˜bin = κ ln(Pbin) + d (5)
Here K˜bin is the median of the capitalist fraction of CEO income within each bin.
Pbin is the hierarchical power (of the CEO) at the midpoint of the firm-size bin. To
incorporate uncertainty caused by the choice of bin size, I regress Eq. 5 onto CEO
data for a variety of different bin sizes. The regressed trend is shown in Figure 8
and summarized in Table 5.
This binned analysis indicates that the capitalist fraction of CEO income grows
consistently with hierarchical power. Note that the capitalist-gradient slope for this
binned analysis is steeper than the slope estimated from raw data. This is because
the binned analysis gives equal weight to each firm-size bin. In contrast, the re-
gression on raw data gives little weight to small firms, which are sparse in our data
sample.
To summarize, the results suggest that among US CEOs, the capitalist fraction
of income increases consistently with hierarchical power. This appears to be true
both between and within firms. Furthermore, a simple log-linear trend emerges
(between capitalist income fraction and hierarchical power) when we study binned
data.
5 From CEOs to the General Population: Extending the Evidence
The CEO evidence suggests that income size, as well as the capitalist fraction of
this income, increase with hierarchical power. My next step is to test if these trends
extend to the general US population. To do this, I propose the following method:
1. Assume CEO trends extend to the general pubic
2. Simulate the implied distribution of income
3. Compare this simulation to US data
This test works by inference. We use a model to predict the distribution of US
income that should occur if the CEO relation between income size, income class
and hierarchical power extends to the general population. If the model’s predicted
distribution of income is consistent with the empirical data, we can then plausibly
infer that the CEO trends are also found among the general US population. I use
this model-based method because data for hierarchical power among the general
US population is currently unavailable (to my knowledge).
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Figure 9: A Landscape View of the US Hierarchy Model
This figure visualizes the US hierarchy model as a landscape of three-dimensional firms.
Each pyramid represents a single firm, with size indicating the number of employees and
height corresponding to the number of hierarchical levels. Panel A uses color to indicate
income relative to the median. Panel B uses shades of red to indicate the capitalist fraction
of individuals’ income. This visual shows 20,000 firms. The actual model uses 1 million
firms to simulate the US firm population.
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5.1 Using A Model to Extrapolate CEO Trends
To extrapolate the CEO evidence to the general population, I use a numerical model
developed in [57]. This model takes the CEO data (as well as firm case-study data)
as inputs and then predicts the distribution of income that should occur if CEO
trends extend to the US population. The model’s parameters are determined from
micro-level data (from firms) . I do not ‘tune’ the model to produce desired results.
From the inputted micro-level data, the model then predicts the macro distribution
of income.
The model has three steps, summarized below. (See Section 8 for technical
details). In Step 1, the model simulates the hierarchical structure of Compustat
firms (the sample of firms used to study CEOs). In Step 2, the model generalizes
this simulation to a more representative size distribution of firms. The model then
simulates individual income for people employed in the US private sector. In Step
3, the model simulates the class component of each person’s income.
Step 1: Simulate the hierarchical structure of Compustat firms. To simulate
the hierarchical structure of Compustat firms, the model first simulates the employ-
ment hierarchy in each firm. To do this, the model assumes that Compustat firms
have the same hierarchical ‘shape’ as the average found in case-study firms. To
simulate the pay hierarchy, the model assumes that income is proportional to hier-
archical power. The model then uses the observed CEO pay ratio to infer the pay
hierarchy within each Compustat firm. The result is a simulation of the hierarchical
structure of each Compustat firm.
Step 2: Generalize the simulation to the US firm population. The next step is
to generalize the Compustat simulation to a size distribution of firms that is more
representative of the US. I simulate the size distribution of US firms using a power-
law distribution. I then use the information from step 1 to simulate the hierarchical
structure of these firms. The result is a simulation of the hierarchical structure of
the US private sector. The model simulates personal income for roughly 20 million
individuals.
Step 3. Simulate class-based income. To simulate the class composition of in-
dividual income, the model fits functions to the binned analysis of the capitalist
fraction of CEO income (Fig. 8). The model then uses these functions to simulate
the class component of individual income as it relates to hierarchical power. This
returns a capitalist and labor component for the income of each individual.
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Visualizing the model. Figure 9 visualizes the model’s output as a landscape,
with firms displayed as pyramids. We can see here the main features of the model.
Income increases with hierarchical rank (Fig. 9A), as does the capitalist fraction
of income (Fig. 9B). We can also see the size distribution of firms. Most firms are
small, but there are a few behemoths. Note that top earners are located mostly at
the tops of large firms. These top-ranked individuals also have the largest capitalist
component of income.
Testing the model. I test the model in two ways. I first compare to US data
the model’s predicted distribution of personal, labor and capitalist income (Section
5.2). I then compare to US data the model’s predicted relation between income size
and income composition (Section 5.3). The model is stochastic, so its results vary
randomly over each iteration. To capture this variation, I run the model many times
and measure both the average result and the range of variation.
5.2 Model Predictions for the Size Distribution of US Income By Class
Figures 10–13 show the model’s predictions for the distribution of US personal,
labor and capitalist income. I compare these predictions to US data over the years
2006–2014.
Summary Statistics
I use three different summary statistics (the Gini index, the top 1% share, and the
power-law exponent of the top 1%) to compare the model to US data. Each statistic
is sensitive to a different part of the income distribution.
The Gini index (Figs. 10A–12A) is sensitive to income dispersion in the ‘body’
of the distribution. The model accurately predicts the Gini index of US personal
income (Fig. 10A) and capitalist income (Fig. 12A). However it overestimates the
Gini index of US labor income (Fig. 11A).
The top 1 % income share (Figs. 10B–12B) is sensitive to inequality in the
distribution tail. The model accurately predicts the top 1% share of personal income
(Fig. 10A). However it overestimates the top 1% share of labor income (Fig. 11B)
and capitalist income (Fig. 12B).
The power-law exponent of the top 1% of incomes (Figs. 10C–12C) measures
the ‘fatness’ of the distribution tail. A smaller exponent indicates a fatter tail. The
model accurately predicts the power-law exponent of US personal income (Fig. 10)
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Inequality — Model Predictions vs. US Data
Metric Source
Labor
Income
Personal
Income
Capitalist
Income
Gini Index (mean) US 0.54 0.61 0.87
Model 0.59 0.62 0.86
Top 1% Share (mean) US 0.14 0.20 0.38
Model 0.18 0.22 0.48
Power-Law Exponent (mean) US 2.82 2.57 2.42
Model 2.77 2.63 2.28
average model error =10.6%
This table compares model predictions to US data using the average of three different summary
statistics of inequality. For the US, this is the mean between 2006–2014. For the model, it is the
mean over many iterations. ‘Average model error’ indicates the mean percentage error of the model
for all the statistics shown in this table.
and labor income (Fig. 11C). However, the model underestimates the exponent of
US capitalist income (Fig. 12C).
Table 6 shows the average values for these three summary statistics. Across all
statistics and all income types, the model deviates from US data by about 11%, on
average.
Income Probability Distributions
Panels D–G in Figures 10–12 show probability distributions for both the model and
US data. To interpret these Figures, look at the overlap between the model and the
US data. If the medians overlap, the model agrees with US data at the given point.
If part of the shaded regions overlap, the model is consistent with some of the US
data. If the shaded regions do not overlap, the model is inconsistent with the US
data at the point in question.
Figures 10D –12D show the probability density of income, plotted on a linear
scale. We can see that the model reproduces the general form of the US distribu-
tion of income. There are, however, deviations for small incomes. For instance,
the model does not reproduce the spike of personal and labor incomes that are very
close to zero. This spike likely represents unemployed and non-employed mem-
bers of the US population. Since the model is based on corporate employment
data (which is biased towards the full-time employed), it does not reproduce this
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spike in small incomes. For small capitalist incomes, the model’s results are highly
uncertain (indicated by the wide spread in the blue-shaded region in Fig. 12D).
While deviating from US data for small incomes, the model more accurately
predicts the behavior of large incomes. This is best seen by looking at the tail of
the complementary cumulative distribution ((Figs. 10F–12F)). For all three income
types, the slope of the model’s tail is close to the US data. The slope is closest for
personal income and labor income. For capitalist income, the model slope deviates
slightly from the US data. This shows visually what we found using the power-law
exponent (Figs. 10C–12C), which quantifies the slope of the distribution tail.
Income Quantiles
Figure 13 compares the model to US data using a Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot.
Here, deviations from the ‘perfect fit’ line indicate a failure of the model. The re-
sults indicate that for all three income types, the model reproduces (with reasonable
accuracy) the tail of the US distribution of income. However, the model fails for
small incomes. The point of failure varies by income type. For personal income,
the model fails below the 20th income percentile. For labor income, the model fails
below the 10th percentile. For capitalist income, the model fails below the 35th
percentile.
5.3 Model Predictions for Income Composition vs. Income Size
For both the model and US data, Figure 14 plots the capitalist composition of in-
come against income size. I call this curve the capitalist income ‘hockey stick’
because of its similarity to the famous hockey-stick graph showing exploding tem-
peratures in the 20th century [58]. Here it is the capitalist fraction of income that
explodes among top earners.
Figure 14 shows two measures of US capitalist income. I continue using cap-
italist income K1* (as in Figures 10–13), which includes income from all forms
of property. But I also calculate capitalist income series K2, which includes only
income from interest and corporate equity (see Table 3).
Consistent with the US data, the model predicts a rapid increase of the capitalist
portion of income among the top 1%. The model results are closest to US capitalist
income K2. This is significant because this series excludes proprietor income. The
capitalist gradient hypothesis proposes that only income from corporate property
should relate to hierarchical power (Section 3). Including rent and proprietor in-
come (in series K1*) does not significantly change the trend between the capitalist
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Figure 10: Personal Income Distribution —Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of total personal income. Each panel compares the hi-
erarchy model’s prediction to US data. Income in Panels D, F and G is normalized so the
median is 1. In Panel G, the shaded region shows the approximate threshold for the top 1%
of incomes. US data comes from the World Inequality Database. The hierarchy model is
stochastic and varies between iterations. I show the model’s 95% range. For sources and
methods, see Section 8.
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Figure 11: Labor Income Distribution — Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of labor income. Each panel compares the hierarchy
model’s prediction to US data. Income in Panels D, F and G is normalized so the median
is 1. In Panel G, the shaded region shows the approximate threshold for the top 1% of
incomes. US data comes from the World Inequality Database, using class definitions L1*
(Table 3). The hierarchy model is stochastic and varies between iterations. I show the
model’s 95% range. For sources and methods, see Section 8.
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Figure 12: Capitalist Income Distribution — Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure shows the distribution of capitalist income. Each panel compares the hierarchy
model’s prediction to US data. Income in Panels D, F and G is normalized so the P75 is 1.
I normalize to P75 because the median capitalist income is sometimes zero. In Panel G, the
shaded region shows the approximate threshold for the top 1% of incomes. US data comes
from the World Inequality Database, using class definitions K1* (Table 3). The hierarchy
model is stochastic and varies between iterations. I show the model’s 95% range. For
sources and methods, see Section 8.
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Figure 13: Q–Q Plot — Model Predictions vs. US Data
This figure uses a Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot to compare the hierarchy model to US data.
For a given income percentile, the Q-Q plot compares the model’s income threshold (the
income cutoff for this percentile) to the US income threshold. I compare here the medians
of these thresholds. For the model, this is the median of all iterations. For the US, it is the
median between 2006–2014. Income percentiles are shown in color. Deviations from the
‘perfect fit’ line indicate areas where the model fails. For each income type, I indicate the
percentiles where the model starts to fail. For personal income (Panel A) and labor income
(Panel B), income thresholds are normalized to the median. Because the median capitalist
income is sometimes zero, I normalize capitalist income to P75. For sources and methods,
see Section 8.
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Figure 14: Income Composition vs. Income Percentile — Model Predictions
vs. US Data
This figure shows, for both the model and US data, the relation between income composi-
tion and income percentile. I use two different measures of US capitalist income — K1*
and K2 (see Table 3). Panel A uses a linear scale on the horizontal axis. Panel B shows the
same data with a reverse logarithmic scale on the horizontal axis. Shaded regions indicate
the 95% range of the data. Lines indicate the median. US data covers the years 2006–2014.
For sources and methods, see Section 8.
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fraction of income and income size. This suggests that the explosion of capitalist
income among top earners is driven mostly by income from equity and interest.
Compared to capitalist income K2, the model slightly underestimates the growth
of the capitalist fraction of income among the top 1%. It also overestimates the
capitalist fraction of income among the bottom 90%. Note that below the 50th
income percentile, net capitalist income in series K2 is actually negative. This
results from interest payments and capital losses on equity. The model does not
allow negative capitalist income, and so does not reproduce this behavior.
5.4 Is the Model Valid for Inference?
There is no objective test that can determine if a model fits empirical data well
enough to use for inference. How well the model must fit the empirical data de-
pends, in part, on our goals. It also depends on systemic uncertainty in both the
empirical data, and the data on which the model is based.
It is obvious, from Figures 10-14, that the model does not perfectly match the
US data. A key point of failure is among small incomes. The question is, does this
small-income failure matter for inferences about hierarchical power? I cautiously
answer no. The reason is that a theory of income distribution based on hierarchy
is primarily concerned with top incomes. Using a model similar to here, [57] finds
that the effects of hierarchy on income become important only among top earners.
The implication is that what matters for inferences about hierarchical power is the
accuracy of the model among top incomes. Fortunately, among top incomes the
model is roughly consistent with the US data.
We should also remember that there is considerable systematic uncertainty in
the data that underlies the model. The model draws conclusions about the shape of
firm hierarchies from a handful of case studies. Also, the CEO data used to model
the capitalist fraction of income is based on an incomplete accounting of capitalist
income. Furthermore, the empirical measures of US capitalist income are based on
accounting definitions that differ from those used to measure the CEO fraction of
capitalist income. The goodness of the model’s fit should be judged in the context
of this systematic uncertainty.
My goal here is to make a rough first inference for how income size and income
class relate to hierarchical power in the United States. For this purpose, I judge the
model’s results to be accurate enough. The model’s predictions match the US data
closely enough to infer that trends found among US CEOs plausibly extend to the
general US population.
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Figure 15: Model Inference for Income Size, Income Class and Hierarchical
Power in the US
This figure shows the inferred three-way relation between income size, income class, and
hierarchical power among the US public. Results are from the hierarchy model, which
extrapolates CEO trends to the general public (Section 5). The plot shows the average
hierarchical power of individuals, grouped by income percentile. The average capitalist
fraction of income is indicated by color. Lines indicate different model iterations.
6 Inferences: Income Size, Income Class and Hierarchical Power
in the United States
Using results from the model, Figure 15 shows the inferred three-way relation
between income size, income composition and hierarchical power in the United
States.
The model suggests that the vast majority of Americans have little hierarchical
power and little capitalist income. But among the top 1%, the model suggests an
explosion of hierarchical power and a corresponding explosion of capitalist income.
This is consistent with Tim Di Muzio’s distinction between the “1% and the rest
of us” [59]. It also gives new meaning to Fitzgerald’s assertion that the “rich are
different”. What makes the rich different, the model suggests, is hierarchical power.
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6.1 Open Questions
The results in Figure 15, combined with the CEO evidence in Section 4, suggest
that studying hierarchical power may shed light on the relation between personal
and functional income distribution. But because this analysis is the first of its kind
(to my knowledge), many questions remain.
First, there is the question of whether our model inference is accurate. An-
swering this question requires better data on firm hierarchy, which will hopefully
become available in the future.
Second, there is the question of causation. Does hierarchical power cause the
size and composition of income to change? If so, why? If not, what is the under-
lying connection? At present, data on firm hierarchy is too sparse to answer these
causal questions. For this reason, I have focused on correlation only.
Third, there is the question of the ‘boundaries’ of hierarchy. I have focused here
on hierarchy within firms. But hierarchies can also extend between firms — what
Bichler and Nitzan call “meso hierarchies” [60]. This involves the use of partial
ownership to wield control over firms. Recent work on corporate ownership shows
that investment firms wield a surprising amount of power [61–63]. Understanding
how this network of ownership relates to hierarchical power is an important task for
future research.
Fourth, do the results here extend beyond the United States? While direct ev-
idence is not available, the modeling methods used here could be applied to other
countries. Researchers interested in using this model can find the code in the Sup-
plementary Material.
Fifth, has the three-way relation between income size, income class and hierar-
chical power changed over time? Given the drastic increase in US income inequality
over the last three decades, this seems likely. Song et al. find that the recent growth
of US top incomes is due mostly to increasing inequality within firms [64]. Does
this have to do with hierarchy? Possibly. I have previously found that the growth of
top US incomes may be due to a redistribution of income towards the tops of firm
hierarchies [65].
Lastly, does the three-way relation between income size, income class and hi-
erarchical power extend to non-capitalist societies? Unfortunately, we know little
about hierarchy in pre-capitalist societies. However, using a similar model as here,
I have found that the growth of hierarchy can possibly explain the origin and evo-
lution of inequality [66]. This suggests that income may increase with hierarchical
power in pre-capitalist societies.
Conclusions 34
What about the relation between hierarchy and income class in pre-capitalist
societies? Admittedly we have very little data on this topic. But consider how Rein-
hard Bendix describes the relation between authority, income and property rights in
German feudal society:
... governmental functions were usable rights which could be sold or leased at
will. For example, judicial authority was a type of property. The person who
bought or leased that property was entitled to adjudicate disputes and receive the
fees and penalties incident to such adjudication. [67][emphasis added]
If we paraphrase Bendix, we arrive at the same reasoning that I used to derive
the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Building on the work of Nitzan and Bichler [12],
I argued that ‘capitalist authority’ is a ‘type of property’. The person who buys this
property is ‘entitled’ to wield hierarchical power and ‘receive income’ in return.
This reasoning led to the hypothesis that the capitalist portion of income should
increase with hierarchical power. Bendix’s description of feudal authority hints that
something like the capitalist gradient hypothesis (but for different income classes)
may apply to feudal societies.
7 Conclusions
This paper has outlined a new way of studying personal and functional income
distribution. Rather than appealing to productivity (like neoclassical economists)
or to exploitation (like Marxists), I have proposed a theory of income distribution
based on hierarchical power. It is the greater command over subordinates, I have
argued, that distinguishes the rich from the poor and capitalists from workers.
The goal of this paper is primarily empirical. I have given theoretical reasons
why hierarchical power might relate to income size and composition (Section 2).
But for the most part, this proposed relation is more of a hunch than a rigorous
prediction. This paper tests this hunch by looking for a correlation between in-
come size and hierarchical power, on the one hand, and income composition and
hierarchical power on the other.
Evidence from US CEOs suggests that this hunch is justified. I find that the
relative income of CEOs increases with hierarchical power, as does the capitalist
composition of this income (Section 4). A model that extrapolates this data suggests
that the trend among CEOs plausibly extends to the general US population (Sections
5 and 6). In other words, it is plausible that there is a three-way relation between
income size, income composition and hierarchical power in the United States.
While much remains unknown, the results here suggest that hierarchical power
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should be further investigated as a determinant of income size and income compo-
sition.
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8 Methods
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work [68]. The supplementary materials include source data, code for analysis, and
model code.
8.1 US Class-Based Income
Data for US class-based income comes from the World Inequality Database (WID).
My income measures are shown in Table 7. These are composed of the WID data
series shown in Tables 8 and 9. I use two WID series to construct K1*, L1*, and T.
This means I merge statistics from both WID series.
The WID data comes from Piketty et al. [56]. For the methods of this study,
see their appendix [69]. This is the most detailed study to date of US class-based
income. However, it comes with some caveats. Piketty et al. subdivide proprietor
income into capitalist and labor components. The capitalist component is series
fkbus. The labor component is series flmil (Table 9). I cannot find, in Piketty’s work,
an explicit statement of the methods behind this split. But according to Rognlie
[70], Piketty assumes that proprietor income “has the same net capital share as the
corporate sector”.
This leads to a difference between my definitions of class-based income (defined
in the main paper) and the empirical data (Table 7). My two-class definition of
capitalist income (K1) includes all proprietor income. In contrast, the empirical
measure K1* contains only a portion of proprietor income. My definition of labor
income (L1) contains no proprietor income. In contrast, the empirical measure L1*
contains a portion of proprietor income.
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In addition to the capitalist income series provided by WID, I construct my own
series K2 shown in Table 7. This includes equity and interest income (with capital
gains).
8.1.1 Methods for Estimating Income Distribution Statistics
WID provides three types of data that I use to compute statistics:
1. Income percentile (bin)
2. Income share (by income percentile bin)
3. Income threshold (by income percentile bin)
As an example, the WID data may indicate that percentiles P99–P100 have an
income share of 15%. This means the top 1% holds 15% of all income. The income
threshold for this bin may be $200,000. This means that the lowest income of the
top 1% is $200,000.
Gini Index: I estimate the Gini index by constructing a Lorenz curve from WID
data. The Gini index equals the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of
perfect equality, divided by the total area under the line of perfect equality.
Top 1% Share: This is provided directly by the WID data.
Power-Law Exponent: I estimate the power-law exponent of the top 1% of in-
comes using income percentile and threshold data. I create binned data where we
know the proportion of people in each bin, and the income boundaries of each bin.
I then use the method discussed in Ref. [71] to estimate the power-law exponent
from this binned data.
Probability Density: I estimate the probability density using income percentile
and threshold data. I first normalize income threshold data so that the median equals
1. I then construct a cumulative distribution. This is the fraction of individuals
below a given income. I estimate the probability density function from the slope of
the cumulative distribution.
Lorenz Curve: The Lorenz curve is constructed from income percentile and in-
come share data. It is the cumulative share of income vs. income percentile.
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Table 7: Measures of US Class-Based Income
Measure Symbol Composition
Capitalist Income
(All Ownership)
K1* both fkinc and pkinc
Capitalist Income
(Scalable Ownership
Only)
K2 fkequ + fkfix
Labor Income L1* both flinc and plinc
Total Income T both fainc and ptinc
Table 8: World Inequality Database Main Series
Series Description Composition
fainc Personal factor income flinc + fkinc
fkinc Personal factor capital income fkhou + fkequ + fkfix + fkbus + fkpen + fkdeb
flinc Personal factor labor income flemp + flmil + flprl
pkinc Personal pre-tax capital income fkinc + pkpen + pkbek
plinc Personal pre-tax labor income flinc + plcon + plbel
ptinc Personal pre-tax income plinc + pkinc
Table 9: World Inequality Database Component Series
Series Description
fkbus Business asset income
fkdeb Interest payments
fkequ Equity asset income
fkfix Interest income
fkhou Housing asset income
fkpen Pension and insurance asset income
flemp Compensation of employees
flmil Labor share of net mixed income
flprl Sales and excise taxes falling on labor
pkbek Capital share of social insurance income
pkpen (Minus) Investment income payable to pension funds
plbel Labor share of social insurance income
plcon (Minus) social contributions
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Cumulative Distribution: I construct the cumulative distribution from income
percentile and threshold data. I normalize income threshold data so that the median
equals 1.
Complementary Cumulative Distribution: I construct the complementary cu-
mulative distribution (CCD) from the cumulative distribution (CD). The y-value for
the CCD is 1 minus the corresponding y-value for the CD.
Income Quantiles: This data is provided directly by WID (reported as income
thresholds by income percentile bin).
Capitalist Income Share vs. Percentile: Capitalist income share K1∗frac is calcu-
lated by merging two series:
K1∗frac =
fkinc / faincpkinc / ptinc (6)
Capitalist income share K2∗frac is calculated as:
K2∗frac = (fkequ+ fkfix) / fainc (7)
8.2 US CEO Data: The Compustat Firm Sample
Data for US CEOs (and their firms) comes from the Execucomp and Compustat
databases. I will refer to this data as the ‘Compustat firm sample’. I use this data
for the case study of CEO pay and as the basis for the US hierarchy model. Methods
are discussed below.
8.2.1 Finding the CEO
I identify CEOs using titles in the Execucomp series TITLEANN. I use a three-step
algorithm:
1. Find all executives whose title contains one or more of the words in the
‘CEO Titles’ list in Table 10.
2. Of these executives, take the subset whose title does not contain any of the
words in the ‘Subordinate Titles’ list in Table 10.
3. If this returns more than one executive per firm per year, chose the execu-
tive with the highest pay.
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8.2.2 CEO Pay and Capitalist Income Fraction
Execucomp contains several different estimates of CEO pay. These differ primarily
in the valuation of stock option compensation. [55] argue that we should use actual
realized gains. This is the difference between the market value of the option and
the exercise value at the time of exercise. Importantly, actual realized gains is
the income recorded by the IRS for tax purposes. I measure CEO total pay and
capitalist income fraction (Kfrac) using the following series:
Total Pay = TOTAL ALT2 (8)
Kfrac =
Actual Realized Gains from Stock Options
Total Pay
(9)
Kfrac =
SHRS VEST VAL+OPT EXER VAL
TOTAL ALT2
(10)
Series descriptions are shown in Table 11.
Table 10: Titles Used to Identify the ‘CEO’
CEO Titles: Subordinate Titles
president vp
chairman v-p
CEO cfo
Chief Executive Officer vice
chmn chief finance officer
president of
coo
division
div
president-
group president
chairmain-
co-president
deputy chairman
pres.-
Chief Financial Officer
Notes: Titles such as ‘president-’ and ‘president of’ are included in the subordi-
nate list because they typically refer to a president of a division within the com-
pany: i.e. ‘president of western division’ or ‘president-western hemisphere’.
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Table 11: Execucomp Compensation Series
Series Description
TOTAL ALT2
SALARY + BONUS + OTHCOMP + NONEQ INCENT +
PENSION CHG + OPT EXER VAL + SHRS VEST VAL
BONUS
The dollar value of a bonus earned by the named executive officer
during the fiscal year.
SALARY
The dollar value of the base salary earned by the named executive
officer during the fiscal year.
OTHCOMP
Other compensation received by the director including perquisites and
other personal benefits, contributions to defined contribution plans
(e.g. 401K plans), life insurance premiums, gross-ups and other tax
reimbursements, discounted share purchases, consulting fees, awards
under charitable award programs, etc.
NONEQ INCENT
Value of amounts earned during the year pursuant to non-equity
incentive plans.
PENSION CHG
Composed of a) above-market or preferential earnings from deferred
compensation plans, and b) aggregate increase in actual value of
defined benefit and actual pension plans during the year.
OPT EXER VAL
Value realized from option exercises during the year. The value is
calculated as of the date of exercise and is based on the difference
between the exercise price and the market price of the stock on the
exercise date.
SHRS VEST VAL Value of restricted shares that vested during the year.
8.2.3 CEO Pay Ratio and Firm Employment
I calculate the CEO pay ratio as:
CEO Pay Ratio =
CEO Pay
Firm Mean Income
(11)
Firm mean income is calculated by dividing total staff expenses (Compustat Series
XLR) by total employment (Compustat Series EMP):
Firm Mean Income =
Total Staff Expenses
Total Employment
(12)
CEO pay ratio and firm mean income data are available for roughly 3000 firm-
year observations from 2006-2016. Figure 16 shows summary statistics of this data.
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Figure 16: Statistics of the Compustat Firm Sample
This figure shows selected statistics of the Compustat firm sample. Panel A shows the
number of firms in the sample over time, Panel B the average firm size, and Panel C the
share of US employment held by these firms. Panel D shows the logarithmic distribution
of firm size, and Panel E shows the logarithmic distribution of the CEO pay ratio. Panel
F shows the mean CEO pay ratio of all firms over time. Panel G shows the logarithmic
distribution of normalized mean pay (mean pay divided by the average pay of the firm
sample in each year). Panel H shows the ratio of mean pay in the sample relative to the US
average (calculated from BEA Table 1.12 by dividing the sum of employee and proprietor
income by the number of workers in BEA Table 6.8C-D. Panel I shows the Gini index of
firm mean pay over time.
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Table 12: Model Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
C CEO to average employee pay ratio
E employment
ε noise factor
h hierarchical rank
I income
n number of hierarchical ranks in a firm
P hierarchical power
s span of control
S number of subordinates
T total for firm
8.3 Hierarchy Model Equations
The hierarchy model assumes that firms are hierarchically structured, with a span
of control that increases exponentially with hierarchical rank. The model simulates
individual income as a function of hierarchical power. I discuss here the model’s
main equations. See Table 12 for notation.
8.3.1 The Employment Hierarchy
For each firm, the model generates an employment hierarchy using the span of con-
trol (s). This is the ratio of employment (E) between two consecutive hierarchical
ranks (h). We let h = 1 be the bottom hierarchical rank. We define the span of
control in rank 1 as s = 1. This leads to a piecewise function for the span of control:
sh ≡
 1 if h = 1Eh−1
Eh
if h≥ 2 (13)
Based on evidence from firm case studies (Fig. 18), the model assumes that the
span of control increases exponentially with hierarchical rank, with a and b as free
parameters:
sh =
 1 if h = 1a · ebh if h≥ 2 (14)
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As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive rank (Eh) de-
creases by a factor of 1/sh. This yields a recursive formula for calculating Eh:
Eh =
⌊
Eh−1
sh
⌋
for h > 1 (15)
The model assumes employment is a whole number and so rounds down to the
nearest integer (notated by bc). By repeatedly substituting Eq. 15 into itself, we
obtain a non-recursive formula for hierarchical employment:
Eh =
⌊
E1 · 1s2 ·
1
s3
· ... · 1
sh
⌋
(16)
In product notation, Eq. 16 becomes:
Eh =
⌊
E1
h
∏
i=1
1
si
⌋
(17)
Total employment ET in the whole firm is the sum of employment in all hi-
erarchical ranks. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical ranks, total firm
employment is:
ET =
n
∑
h=1
Eh (18)
Because the model builds the hierarchy from the bottom up, n is not known
beforehand. The model defines n using Eq. 17. The model calculates employment
in every hierarchical rank until it reaches a rank with zero employment. The top
rank n is the highest rank with non-zero employment:
n = {h | Eh ≥ 1 and Eh+1 = 0} (19)
To summarize, the employment hierarchy in each firm is determined by 3 free
parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and employment in the bottom
rank, E1. Code for this algorithm is located in exponents.h and hierarchy.h in
the Supplementary Material [68].
8.3.2 The Pay Hierarchy
The model assumes that individual income is a function of hierarchical power:
Ii,h, f = I¯1, f · (P¯h, f )β f · εi (20)
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Here Ii,h, f is the income of the ith person in hierarchical level h of firm f . I¯1, f
is the average income in the bottom hierarchical level of the firm. P¯h, f is average
hierarchical power in level h of the firm. β f is the power-income exponent of the
given firm. Lastly, εi is a stochastic noise factor that adds dispersion to individual
income.
In each firm, we define the average hierarchical power in level h as:
Ph = S¯h +1 (21)
Here S¯h is the average number of subordinates per member of rank h:
S¯h =
h−1
∑
i=1
Ei
Eh
(22)
8.3.3 Statistics
Mean Income in a Firm. Mean income in a firm (I¯T ) is the average of mean
income in each hierarchical rank (I¯h), weighted by the employment in each rank
(Eh):
I¯T =
n
∑
h=1
I¯h · EhET (23)
CEO Pay Ratio. The model defines the ‘CEO’ as the person in the top hierarchi-
cal rank, n. CEO pay is thus I¯n, average income in the top hierarchical rank. The
CEO pay ratio (C) is defined as CEO income divided by average income in the firm:
C =
I¯n
I¯T
(24)
8.4 The United States Hierarchy Model
The US hierarchy model uses the equations from Section 8.3 to simulate the hierar-
chical structure of the US private sector. The model’s parameters are summarized
in Table 13. I detail here how I restrict these parameters.
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Table 13: Parameters in the US Hierarchy Model
Parameter Definition Action Scope
α
Power-law exponent for the size
distribution of firms
Determines the skewness of the firm size
distribution
—
a, b Span of control parameters
Determines the shape of the firm
hierarchy.
Identical for all firms.
E1
Employment in base hierarchical
level
Used to build the employment hierarchy
from the bottom up. Determines total
employment.
Specific to each firm.
β Power-income exponent
Determines how rapidly income increases
with hierarchical power.
Specific to each firm.
I¯1 Mean pay in base hierarchical level
Sets the base level income of the firm,
which determines firm average pay.
Specific to each firm.
ε Power-income noise factor
Adds stochastic noise to the relation
between income and hierarchical power.
Identical for all firms.
µK ,σK Capitalist gradient parameters
Determine the capitalist fraction of
individual income as a function of
hierarchical power.
Identical for all
individuals.
8.4.1 Simulating the Size Distribution of US Firms
Evidence suggests that the size distribution of firms in the US (and other G7 coun-
tries) roughly follows a power law [72, 73]. In a power-law distribution, the proba-
bility of finding a firm of size x is:
p(x) ∝
1
xα
(25)
Figure 17 compares the size distribution of US firms to a discrete power law.
The inset plot shows the best-fit values for the power-law exponent α , fitted using
the method described in Ref. [71].
To simulate the size distribution of US firms, I use a discrete power-law distri-
bution of 1 million firms. In each iteration, the model sets the power-law exponent
α by sampling from the set of fitted US values (Fig. 17, inset). To ensure that the
simulation produces realistically sized firms, I truncate the power-law distribution
at a maximum firm size of 2.3 million. This is the present size of Walmart, the
largest US firm that has ever existed.
Code for the random number generator for the discrete power-law distribution
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Figure 17: The Size Distribution of Firms in the United States
This figure compares the firm size distribution in the United States to a discrete power-
law distribution. The ‘steps’ indicate the firm-size bins. The inset plot shows the best-
fit power-law exponent (α) in each year. The US data combines ‘employer’ firms and
unincorporated self-employed workers. Data for ‘employer’ firms is from the US Census
Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics. I augment this data with Bureau of Labor Statistics
data for unincorporated self-employed workers (series LNU02032185 and LNU02032192).
The histogram preserves firm-size bins used by the Census. I add self-employed individuals
to the first bin. The last histogram bin contains all firms with more than 10,000 employees.
can be found in rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material [68]. This code is
an adaptation of Collin Gillespie’s [74] discrete power-law generator found in the R
poweRlaw package. Gillespie’s generator is, in turn, an adaptation of the algorithm
outlined by Clauset et al. [75].
8.4.2 Span-of-Control Parameters a and b
The shape of the employment hierarchy in simulated firms is determined by the
span-of-control parameters a and b. To set these parameters, I regress Eq. 14 onto
span-of-control data from case-study firms (Fig. 18A). I then use Eqs. 14, 17, and
18 to create the employment hierarchy in each simulated firm. Note that all firms
are assigned the same values for a and b.
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Figure 18: Idealized Hierarchy Implied by Firm Case Studies
Panel A shows how the span of control varies with hierarchical level in case-study firms
[48–53]. The span of control is the subordinate-to-superior ratio between adjacent hierar-
chical levels. The x-axis corresponds to the upper hierarchical level in each corresponding
ratio. Case-study firms are indicated by color. I have added horizontal ‘jitter’ to better visu-
alize the data. The line indicates an exponential regression, with the grey region indicating
the regression 95% confidence interval. Panel B shows the idealized firm hierarchy that is
implied by the regression in Panel A. Error bars show the uncertainty in the hierarchical
shape, calculated using a bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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The model incorporates uncertainty in a and b using the bootstrap method [76]. I
run the model many times, with each iteration regressing a and b on a bootstrapped
sample of the firm case-study data. Figure 18B shows the shape of the modeled
employment hierarchy for a generic large firm. Code implementing the bootstrap is
located in boot span.h in the Supplementary Material [68].
8.4.3 Employment in the Base Hierarchical Level (ET )
Given span of control parameters a and b, each simulated firm hierarchy is con-
structed from the bottom hierarchical level up. To do this, we must estimate E1, the
employment in the base hierarchical level.
To estimate E1 in each firm, I use the model to create a numerical function re-
lating base level employment E1 to total firm employment ET . I input a range of
different base employment values into equations 14, 17, and 18 and calculate total
employment for each value. The result is a discrete mapping relating base-level
employment to total employment. I then use the C++ Armadillo interpolation func-
tion to linearly interpolate between these discrete values. This creates a numerical
function that returns E1 when given total firm employment ET and span-of-control
parameters a and b.
Code implementing this method is located in base fit.h in the Supplementary
Material [68].
8.4.4 Power-Income Exponent β
The power-income exponent (β ) determines the rate that income increases with
hierarchical power in simulated firms (see Eq. 20). Unlike the span of control
parameters, I allow β to vary between firms.
I restrict the variation of β using a two-step process. I first ‘tune’ the model
to data from Compustat firms. This returns a distribution of β that is specific to
Compustat firms. I then fit this data with a parameterized distribution, from which
simulated values for β are randomly chosen.
8.4.5 Fitting Power-Income Exponent β to Compustat Firms
I fit β to Compustat firms using the CEO pay ratio (C). The first step of this process
is to simulate the employment hierarchy for each Compustat firm using parameters
a, b, and E1 (the latter is determined from total employment). Given the simulated
employment hierarchy, the CEO pay ratio in the modeled firm is uniquely deter-
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Figure 19: Estimating the Power-Income Exponent (β ) Inside Compustat
Firms
This figure shows the β values fitted to Compustat firms. Panel A shows how the fitted
values of β relate to firm size and the CEO pay ratio. The discrete changes in color (evident
as vertical lines) correspond to changes in the number of hierarchical levels within simulated
firms. Panel B shows the distribution of the fitted values of β . Note that fitted values for β
vary between model iterations.
mined by the parameter β . I choose β so that the model produces a CEO pay ratio
that is equivalent to the Compustat data.
To find the best-fit value for β , I use numerical optimization (the bisection
method) to minimize the following error function:
ε(β ) =
∣∣Cmodel−CCompustat∣∣ (26)
Here Cmodel is the modeled CEO pay ratio, and CCompustat is the Compustat CEO
pay ratio.
To ensure that there are no large errors, the model discards Compustat firms for
which the best-fit β parameter produces an error larger than ε = 0.01. Figure 19
shows an example of the fitted β values for all Compustat firm-year observations.
Code implementing this fitting method is located in fit beta.h in the Supplemen-
tary Material [68].
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Figure 20: Modeling the Distribution of the Parameter β
This figure visualizes the algorithm used to simulate the distribution of the parameter β .
This parameter determines how rapidly income increases with hierarchical power in a given
firm. Panel A shows binned data for σE (the lognormal scale parameter) for Compustat
firms. Each dot indicates σE for the given firm-size bin. The straight line indicates the
modeled relation (Eq. 30). Panel B shows how the modeled dispersion of β decreases with
firm size. Panel C compares the distribution of β for Compustat firms to the simulated
distribution, created by injecting Compustat-sized firms into the model. Panel D uses the
same method to compare the CEO pay ratio in Compustat firms to that produced by injecting
Compustat-sized firms into the model. Contour P10 contains 10% of the data, contour P50
contains 50%, and contour P90 contains 90% of the data.
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8.4.6 Simulating the Distribution of β for All US Firms
Once we have estimated β for every Compustat firm, the next step is to fit a pa-
rameterized distribution to this data. For Compustat firms, the distribution of β is
roughly lognormal, with dispersion that tends to decline with firm size
I model the distribution of β using a lognormal distribution with a constant
location parameter µ and a scale parameter σE that varies with firm size:
β (E) = lnN (β ;µ,σE) (27)
The location parameter µ is constant for all firms and is given by:
µ = ln(β Compustat) (28)
To estimate the scale parameter σ , I calculate the standard deviation of ln(β Compustat)
within groups of firms binned by firm size E:
σE = SD
[
ln(β Compustat)
]
E (29)
Figure 20A shows how σE varies with firm size. Each dot indicates σE calculated
on a log-spaced firm-size bin. I model σE as a log-linear function of firm size:
σE = c1 ln(E)+ c2 (30)
Once we have estimated the parameters µ and σE , we use Eq. 27 to generate β
values for each simulated firm. Figure 20B shows how the modeled dispersion of
β declines with firm size.
To test the above algorithm, I apply it back to Compustat firms. I ‘inject’
Compustat-sized firms into the model, and test if the properties of these simulated
firms match the properties of the real-world Compustat firms. Figures 20C and 20D
show the results. Figure 20C compares the simulated distribution of β to the values
fitted to Compustat firms (βCompustat). Figure 20D shows how the CEO pay ratio
grows with hierarchical power. Instead of plotting raw data, this figure shows a con-
tour of the data for various density thresholds. In both cases, the model reasonably
approximates Compustat values.
8.4.7 Mean Pay in the Base Hierarchical Level (I¯1)
The base-level pay parameter (I¯1) determines average pay in simulated firms. As
with β , I allow I¯1 to vary across firms. I restrict this variation using a two-step
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process. I first ‘tune’ the model to data from Compustat firms. This creates a
distribution of base pay specific to Compustat firms. I then fit this data with a
parameterized distribution, from which simulation parameters are randomly chosen.
8.4.8 Estimating Base Pay I¯1 in Compustat Firms
Having already fitted a hierarchical pay structure to each Compustat firm (in the
process of estimating β ), we can use this data to estimate base pay for each firm.
To do this, we set up a ratio between base level pay (I¯1) and firm mean pay (I¯T ) for
both the model and Compustat data:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯ CompustatT
=
I¯ model1
I¯ modelT
(31)
Because the Compustat data covers multiple years, I first adjust firm mean pay
(I¯CompustatT ) for inflation. I normalize I¯
Compustat
T by dividing it by the average of firm
mean pay for all firms in the given year.
The modeled ratio between base pay and firm mean pay (I¯ model1 /I¯
model
T ) is in-
dependent of the choice of base pay. This is because the modeled firm mean pay is
actually a function of base pay (see Eq. 23). If we run the model with I¯ model1 = 1,
then Eq. 31 reduces to:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯ CompustatT
=
1
I¯ modelT
(32)
To solve for I¯ Compustat1 , we rearrange Eq. 32 to get :
I¯ Compustat1 =
I¯ CompustatT
I¯ modelT
(33)
The model uses Eq. 33 to estimate base pay I¯ Compustat1 for each Compustat firm.
Code implementing this method is located in fit beta.h in the Supplementary
Material [68].
8.4.9 Simulating the Distribution of Base Pay I¯1 for All US Firms
Once each Compustat firm has a fitted value for base-level mean pay, we fit this data
with a parametric distribution. I use a gamma distribution to model the distribution
of base-level pay (Fig. 21).
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Figure 21: Modeling the Distribution of Base Pay in Compustat Firms
This figure shows the distribution of (fitted) mean pay in the base level of Compustat firms.
Pay is normalized so that the average income in the Compustat sample (in each year) is 1. I
model this data with a gamma distribution.
Note that the distribution of base pay in Compustat firms has a bimodal struc-
ture. I do not try to replicate this structure because I feel it is not representative of
the US firm population. The lower mode in the Compustat data is composed mostly
of chain restaurants, which seem to be over-represented in the Compustat sample.
While the gamma distribution fits the Compustat data quite roughly, it fits better
than other parameterized distributions.
Once we have fitted the Compustat data with a gamma distribution, we then
sample from this distribution to simulate base-level pay in modeled firms. Code
implementing this method is located in base pay sim.h in the Supplementary Ma-
terial [68].
8.4.10 Power-Income Noise Factor
I model noise (ε) in the power-income relation using a lognormal random variate:
ε ∼ lnN (µ,σ) (34)
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Figure 22: Determining the Power-Income ‘Noise’ Parameter
This figure shows the distribution of income dispersion (measured using the Gini index)
within hierarchical ranks of case-study firms [48–53,77]. I use the mean of this distribution
(with associated uncertainty) to set the power-income noise parameter ε . For methods used
to calculate within-rank income dispersion in the case-study data, see the Appendix in [78].
The noise factor is designed to reproduce the average income dispersion within
hierarchical ranks of case-study firms. I set the lognormal scale parameter (µ) so
that the distribution of ε has a mean of 1:
µ = ln(1)− 1
2
σ2 (35)
To determine σ , we first calculate the mean Gini index (G¯) of inequality within
hierarchical ranks of case-study firms (Fig. 22). We then calculate σ using:
σ = 2 · erf−1(G¯) (36)
This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a lognormal distri-
bution: G = erf(σ/2).
To incorporate uncertainty in the case-study data, each model iteration uses a
different bootstrap resample to calculate G¯. Code implementing this method is
located in boot sigma.h in the Supplementary Material [68].
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8.4.11 Class Composition of Individual Income
I model the class composition of individual income as a function of hierarchical
power. The capitalist fraction of income (Kfrac) increases with the logarithm of
hierarchical power (P), with some associated noise (ε):
Kfrac ∝ ln(P) · ε (37)
The labor fraction of income (Lfrac) is then the complement of the capitalist fraction:
Lfrac = 1−Kfrac (38)
Conceptually, then, class-based income is a simple function of hierarchical
power. The complication, however, is that the dispersion ε in capitalist income
fraction is not simple. To replicate dispersion in the capitalist fraction of CEO in-
come, I model Kfrac as a partially truncated normal distribution. I draw values from
a truncated normal distribution with an upper bound of 1:
Kfrac ∼N (Kfrac;µK,σK); Kfrac ≤ 1, (39)
I then create a lower bound by setting to zero all randomly drawn values that are
less than zero:
if(Kfrac)< 0 then Kfrac = 0 (40)
The parameters µK and σK are both functions of firm size. To model these pa-
rameters, I first fit a truncated normal distribution to CEO capitalist income fraction
data, binned by firm size. Within each firm-size bin, I use numeric optimization to
find the values for µK and σK that best reproduce the distribution of the capitalist
fraction of CEO income. I then model µK as a log-linear function of firm size (Fig.
18A):
µK = c1 ln(P)+ c2 (41)
I model σK by first modeling the relative standard deviation |σK/µK| as a power
function of hierarchical power (Fig. 18A):
RSD =
∣∣∣∣σKµK
∣∣∣∣= c1Pc2 (42)
Methods 56
I then define σK as:
σK = RSD · |µK| (43)
I test the above algorithm by applying it back to the CEO data. I ‘inject’ (into the
model) individuals with the same hierarchical power as those in our CEO sample.
I then simulate the capitalist component of their income. Figures 23C and 23D
show how this simulation compares to the original data. Figure 23C compares
the distribution of the capitalist fraction of income for all individuals. Figure 23D
shows how the capitalist fraction of income grows with hierarchical power. In both
cases, the model reproduces (with reasonable accuracy) the trends found in the
empirical data.
To incorporate uncertainty, each model iteration uses different firm-size bins to
estimate µK and σK . Code implementing this method is located in k func.h in the
Supplementary Material [68].
8.4.12 Summary of Model Structure
The model is implemented in C++ using a modular design. Each major task is
carried out by a separate function that is defined in a corresponding header file.
Table 14 summarizes the model’s structure in the order that functions are called.
In each step, I briefly summarize the action that is performed, and reference the
section where this action is described in detail.
Methods 57
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
P25
P75
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 100 101 102 103 104 105 106
Firm Size (Employees) = CEO Hierarchical Power Firm Size (Employees) = CEO Hierarchical Power
Capitalist Fraction of Income CEO Hierarchical Power = Firm Employment
µ K
σ
K
µ K
D
en
sit
y
Ca
pi
ta
lis
t F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 In
co
m
e
l
Model
Value fitted to CEO data within
log−spaced firm−size bin l
Model
Value fitted to CEO data within
log−spaced firm−size bin
Model
CEO Data
CEO Data
Model
A.  µK vs. Hierachical Power B.  σK µK  vs. Hierachical Power
C.  Distribution of Capitalist Income Fraction D.  Capitalist Income Fraction vs. Hierarchical Power
Figure 23: The Capitalist Gradient Model
This figure shows the steps used to simulate the relation between the capitalist fraction of
income and hierarchical power. Using Eqs. 39 and 40, Panels A and B show how the
parameters µK and σK vary with firm size. Each point represents the value fitted to binned
CEO data. The line indicates the modeled relation. Panels C and D compare the CEO data
to simulated data, created by injecting individuals with the same hierarchical power as our
CEOs into the model. Panel C shows the distribution of the capitalist fraction of income.
Using data binned by firm size, Panel D shows how the capitalist fraction of income changes
with hierarchical power.
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Table 14: Structure of the Hierarchy Model
Step Action Reference Section Parameter(s) File(s)
1 Bootstrap firm case-study data 8.4.2, 8.4.10 a, b, σ
boot span.h
boot sigma.h
2
Estimate employment in the
base hierarchical level of each
Compustat firm
8.4.3 E1 base fit.h
3
Fit power-income exponent to
each Compustat firm
8.4.5 β fit beta.h
4
Estimate base-level pay in each
Compustat firm
8.4.8 I1 fit beta.h
5
Generate a firm-size distribution
that follows a power law
8.4.1 α rpld.h
6
Estimate base-level employment
in each simulated firm
8.4.3 E1 base fit.h
7
Model the distribution of
base-level pay. Assign a value
to each simulated firm
8.4.9 I1 base pay sim.h
8
Model the distribution of the
hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter. Assign a value to
each simulated firm
8.4.6 β beta sim.h
9 Run hierarchy model 8.3
all but capitalist
gradient
parameters
model.h
10
Assign class composition to
individual income
8.4.11 µK , σK k func.h
Notes: Model code uses Armadillo, an open-source linear algebra library for C++ [79].
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